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Abstract 
 
This paper evaluates some factors that affect longevity in Africa, with the aim of offering an insight 
on how government economic policy and consumption spending affect the lives of people in 
developing countries. Government economic policy was found to be contributing in a negative 
manner to life expectancy in the countries in our sample. It was also found that apathy between the 
civil service (the embodiment of institutions) and political office holders to be the greatest 
stumbling block against the success of governmental economic policy, this creates a hole in 
institutions since they remain the pipe through which revenue is disbursed and policies are 
implemented for the general good of the populace. After interacting institution with economic 
policy economic policy had significant effect on life expectancy it was likely that institutions were 
either circumvented or ignored, leading to possible short comings on the overall effect that 
government economic policy would have had on life expectancy. 
 
Keywords: Corruption, life expectancy, economic policy, institutions, government spending. 
JEL:  H5, I15, I18, I28, I38, J1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Introduction 
            Several factors work together to increase mortality rate in developing countries and sub-
Saharan Africa in particular. Some of these include infectious tropical diseases that often affect 
their marginalized population due to poor education, lack of social awareness, political instability 
and civil strife.  Infectious tropical diseases are often a major cause of high death rate prevalent in 
many sub-Saharan African countries since most of the people in sub-Saharan Africa live below the 
poverty line, therefore the tendency for disease to spread and patients to die as a result of inability 
to afford medical treatment is high. Cholera for instance, according to the World Health 
Organization report 2010 caused about 130000 deaths with over 2.5 million infected worldwide. In 
Africa alone according to United Nations Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF) report 2011 more 
than 85000 cases of cholera infection has been recorded with a 4.7 percent mortality rate. Other 
diseases such as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), responsible for acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome disease (AIDS) for instance is a major cause of death in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Sub-Saharan Africa according to 2009 United Nations Statistics also accounts for about 65% of 
HIV AIDS infected people and about 75% of all deaths associated with HIV AIDS Worldwide. 
While malaria fever, polio, tuberculosis etc are widely responsible for a high amount of deaths 
among Africa’s population. Government economic policies if favorable can empower people 
through employment, to afford access to health care and decent living which can prevent premature 
death.  Social factors such as poor education and lack of information regarding treatment and 
preventive methods that could be useful in avoiding the risk of infection are also lacking, poor 
literacy rate makes it cumbersome to pass on such information to the populace. UNESCO World 
education regional review of year 2000 showed that only about 52% of the children in sub-Saharan 
Africa were enrolled in primary schools, this was the lowest anywhere in the World. Africa also 
recorded the highest number of children deprived of basic education according to Transparency 
International World report of 2010 conducted among 8500 educators in seven countries. Africa 
continues to account for the highest amount of illiterate adults worldwide and has one of the lowest 
school enrollment rates. Preventing major illness and other factors that can lead to early deaths can 
many a time hinge on early detection and prevention which can be achieved better in a more literate 
and socially aware society. Good information can help eradicate poor religious practices, outdated 
customary traditional rites and beliefs that are a risk to longevity such as female genital mutilation 
which can in some instance lead to death through female circumcision infections. Poverty and 
unemployment is also rampant among the population, this often makes a large section of the 
population to be vulnerable since in some instances they are likely not to be able to afford access to 
basic social amenities. Political factors such as instability and civil strife can in some cases lead to 
civil war and a high degree of uncertainty. This can make government to fail leading to a disruption 
in daily life. This in turn can affect economic activities and cause a lot of suffering due to shortages 
of basic supplies, which if exist for a prolonged period of time can lead to poor living standard and 
outbreak of epidemics. The second Congo civil war of 1998 to 2003 according to United Nations 
2004 Statistics is recorded among the most devastating  African civil wars in modern history, with 
the war alone responsible for as many as 5.4 million deaths, with most deaths as a result of the 
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underlying effects of the war particularly starvation. Institutional weakness within the body polity 
of a country can also be responsible for most political factors related deaths since good institutions 
can prevent a systematic breakdown of the governing authority thereby preventing a gradual drift 
into anarchy. The aim of this study is to examine the effect of government economic policy on life 
expectancy in Africa. Government spending can improve infrastructure and mitigate risk associated 
with mortality on the short-run. Therefore  government economic decisions can be divided into two 
spheres which are its monetary and trade policies which is referred to as economic policy on the one 
hand in this paper, and it policies regarding social spending which is referred to as government 
consumption spending on the other, this is reasonable because  government spending will likely 
contribute to longevity in a positive manner, but it is not expected that its monetary and trade 
policies will contribute positively to longevity particularly in developing countries with weak 
institutions, since institutions can weaken government policies if they are ineffective or bypassed. 
Secondly this paper will also study the extent to which government consumption spending (its fiscal 
policy component) cushions factors that are a risk to longevity in Africa. The rest of this paper is 
divided into four sections, literature review, some theory, empirical analysis and finally the 
concluding sections. 
Literature Review 
         Africa is plagued by a lot of diseases, social strife and civil wars, that are otherwise 
preventable. Malaria fever according World Health Organization report 2010 was responsible for 
about 655000 deaths in Africa in 2010 alone. Africa’s has a high population living below the 
poverty line, this makes it one of the poorest continents in the world. This is consistent with past 
literature that state that the average per capita income in sub-Saharan Africa is less than one-
twentieth that of North America (Acemoglu D et al (2002) and Acemoglu (2004)). Some basic 
reasons for this are the lack of viable markets for domestic trade, its high amount of poorly educated 
people, and finally the presence of old and outdated machineries which are nonexistent in some 
instances for its manufacturing industry (Acemoglu D. et al (2002)). However these are just some 
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theoretical and secondary reasons for under development in Africa1. The primary reason for 
underdevelopment in Africa continues to lie on the foundation upon which the present method of 
governance is built. Most of the institutions of governance were developed during the colonial era 
and where meant to serve the purpose of the colonial governments therefore they were not well 
suited to meet indigenous societal circumstances, since most of the colonies were used as raw 
material exporting economies particularly in tropical regions. This meant that institutions were 
apparently weak and unreliable. Africa’s huge deposits of untapped natural resource also 
contributes to its burden, it makes it highly susceptible to corruption. Past studies also show that 
countries endowed with high levels of natural resources do tend to grow more slowly compared to 
those with little or no resource (see Sachs and Warner, 1995), and growth could also be weakened if 
institutional frameworks are weak (see Mehlum et al, 2006)2. The presence of natural resource in 
developing countries therefore plays a role in weakening institutions in developing countries, since 
it provides government with alternative revenue to run government, thereby preventing the setting 
up of effective taxation mechanism for sustainable revenue generation (see Ross 2001).   
Institutional weakness is also prevalent today among African countries because of the gross neglect 
of the civil service and due process in policy implementation, government can for example rely on 
its revenues from natural resource to repress dissent, either through paying off opposition (by 
awarding them contracts in high profile infrastructure projects) resulting to weakening of the civil 
service or governing through violence and intimidation. Corruption can also lead to failure of 
democratic governments in developing countries since this can have adverse effect on growth and 
internal stability (Karl, 1997; Ross, 2001)3. The weaknesses in the internal structures of developing 
countries often give room to corrupt officials to run government policies in a vague manner or to 
lead the populace in these developing countries in complete secrecy. Through the implementation of 
                                                             
1 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) examine the differences in European death rates in order to estimate the effect 
of institutions, on economic performance. Europeans were noticed to have adopted very different colonization policies in different 
colonies with rest to its geographical position, with different associated institutions.  
2 Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) also explain how institutions are weakened by the presences of natural resources 
through corruption and the scramble for allocation of exploration rights thereby limiting growth in resource rich countries.  
3Michael Ross (2001) in “Extractive Sectors and the Poor” explains the link between corruption and mineral extraction and 
how democracies are likely to fail due to foreign interest and institutional weakness in resource rich developing countries. He finds 
that the scramble for power is often associated with the presence of natural resources in many developing countries. 
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weak economic policies an oligarch class often emerges that rules with impunity and become 
gradually insensitive to the plight of the populace. The effective use of institutions for governance 
in conjunction with a reliable civil service structure can help rectify this problem. Institutions can be 
classified into different categories such as judicial institutions, democratic institutions, and 
economic institutions. Life expectancy can have serious effects on productivity in developing 
countries.  Past literature has also discussed the relation between longevity and growth in a host of 
industrialized countries. Barro (1989) discovered that as the life expectancy of a country rises to the 
age of 69, the level of investment and the growth rate increased in a reasonable manner for many 
developed countries; but in cases where life expectancy rises to the age of 70 and beyond, the level 
of investment and the growth rate drops, this was higher for developed countries compared to 
developing countries.4 (See Lee, Zhang and Zhang (2002) for more explanations). Other papers 
have investigated the impact that population aging has on growth Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1992),  
found that population aging has a possible adverse impact on national savings, while Preston (1987) 
found that aging increases the competition for resources between the consumption and health needs 
of old people and the investment in children. Attaining old age also means that inheritance could 
likely be received by the children of such elderly people, who will likely pass on their wealth to 
their offspring, and the amount of such inheritance may be reduced however by longer years of 
consumption by the elderly due to sickness or possible periods of inactivity see Kalemi-Ozcan 
(2002) and Soares (2005). Interestingly other papers such as Kelley and Schmidt (1995)5 found a 
positive effect, in the reduction in death rates, on growth in less developed countries suggesting that 
longevity drives growth in a number of countries, while Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) also find a 
that slight positive effect of life expectancy on growth but state that life expectancy does not affect 
income.  To the best of our knowledge the direct link between economic policy and life expectancy 
                                                             
4Barro(1989) using a cross-section of countries, found that investment ratio and growth increased for developed countries 
with life expectancy of up to 69 years, but as life expectancy increased beyond 70 years growth rate decreased and investment 
reduced considerably. 
5Kelly and Schmidt (1995) in “Aggregate Population and Economic Growth Correlation: The Role of The Component of 
Demographic Change” found that longevity has a positive significant effect on growth. The implication of their study is that 
cushioning factors that increase mortality will benefit government by allowing people to contribute more to the society if they live 
longer thereby creating wealth for the society. 
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has not yet been well researched even though lots of literature shed light on the role of institutions 
can have on life expectancy. 
Theory 
            A simple theory is presented to depict how governmental policy will interplay with other 
interaction within and outside a system in shaping the life expectancy or longevity of people living 
within a specified geographical location. The theoretical model is such that a change in life 
expectancy depends on the change in government economic policy and its interaction with other 
country specific factors and exogenous variables that affect life expectancy. Changes in life 
expectancy will depend upon other interactions, such as other factors within the system e.g. wages 
(w) which represents the relative individual income that allows the citizenry to access the basic 
provisions within a system with an intent of living a comfortable life, the cost of capital (v) which 
depicts the cost of maintaining and providing social amenities, the quality of institutions (I) through 
which these policies are implemented and other exogenous variables (z). The model suggests that it 
is the factors that affect life expectancy in general that determine how long an individual within any 
given system will live. So government will tend to maximize their policy subject to the constraints 
that limit or improve how effective economic policies can produce the desired effects in improving 
longevity.  If countries are considered as firms whose cost are functions of several factors.  These 
include the cost of labor (w), the cost of capital (v) in executing socio economic projects, day to day 
costs of running institutions (I), and some other form of social or economic interest (z). The cost of 
labor is the wage rate per unit of output produced.   The cost of capital can be viewed as the typical 
rental price of capital but also more broadly as to include additional factors impacting the cost of 
obtaining capital such as access to credit. Running costs are a function of provision of basic 
amenities such as health care and more importantly other forms infrastructure, while the cost of 
maintaining an international status and ideology of some form can be viewed a form of social or 
national interest that can attract investment or international confidence by portraying the presence 
of stability in a country to shore up investor confidence. So, the firms total cost function can be 
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written as ܶܥ௜ = ௜݂(ݓ,ݒ, ܫ, ݖ) ௜ܺ. The marginal cost (MC) can be expressed as ௜݂(ݓ, ݒ, ܫ, ݖ).  as 
firms’ investment in human capital increase we expect an increase in output leading to some level 
of prosperity thereby improving longevity. It can be assumed that eventually scarcities will occur 
and the marginal cost of production will rise.  This can occur because of the rising cost of investing 
in an additional citizen and/or because of increase in capital costs of maintaining a citizen is rising.  
Eventually, there reaches a point at which equilibrium occurs. This profit maximization point ( ௜ܺ∗) 
will represent the point at which  ܯܴ௜ = ܯܥ௜ , also expressed as ௜ܲ = ௜݂(ݓ, ݒ, ܫ, ݖ)  where the cost 
in maintaining a citizen or catering for an additional citizen will equal the output that such a citizen 
will produce on the long-run . One of the goals of government economic policy (݌௜)  is to improve 
living conditions of the citizens in their countries.  There are many ways in which this can occur.  
Government economic policy can increase education and training of workers, which would lower 
the firms labor cost per unit produced.  So, the wage cost per unit produced can be expressed as a 
negative function of economic policy ݓ௜(݌௜).  Economic policy may also subsidize social amenities 
for citizens or come in the form of provisions of schools or product subsidy like petrol or gas used 
for individuals and households.  Therefore the cost of capital can be written as a negative function 
of government economic policy, ݒ௜(݌௜).  The availability of wealth to a country may also lead to the 
promotion of a social status for a country with it might come some form of rent seeking behavior of 
government officials since more funds flowing into ideological projects may end up been diverted 
by corrupt officials seeking higher payout and have a spillover effect on the quality of institutions. 
Therefore, the costs imposed by rent seeking officials are modeled as a positive function of 
government economic policy, ݖ௜(݌௜). with policy included in the model we can rewrite the 
equilibrium condition as ߪ௜ = ௜݂[ݓ௜(݌௜),ݒ௜(݌௜), ܫ௜(݌௜)ܼ௜(݌௜)]  .  
           This equilibrium condition can be examined with respect to changes in economic policy.  It 
is reasonable to assume that economic policy does not impact output; therefore, the differentiation 
of this condition with respect to economic policy is only a differentiation of the marginal cost 
function.  This can be expressed as shown below. 
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(1.)                          ࣔ࢒࢏
ࣔ࢖࢏
= ࣔ࢒࢏
ࣔ࢝࢏
ࣔ࢝࢏
ࣔ࢖࢏
+ ࣔ࢒࢏
ࣔ࢜࢏
ࣔ࢜࢏
ࣔ࢖࢏
+ ࣔ࢒࢏
ࣔࡵ࢏
ࣔࡵ࢏
ࣔ࢖࢏
+ ࣔ࢒࢏
ࣔࢠ࢏
ࣔࢠ
ࣔ࢖࢏
  
first expression on the right hand side ( డ௟೔
డ௪೔
డ௪೔
డ௣೔
≤ 0) represents government economic policy 
potentially lowering the cost of labor.  The scenario where government economic policy potentially 
lowers cost of capital is represented as   డ௟೔
డ௩೔
డ௩೔
డ௣೔
≤ 0.  The potential reduction in costs of running 
institutions   is shown as     డ௟೔
డூ೔
డூ೔
డ௣೔
≤ 0.   The possible rise in rent seeking or other socio economic 
interest costs of some sorts is the last term on the right hand side which is    డ௟೔
డ௭೔
డ௭೔
డ௣೔
≥ 0.  Therefore, 
the overall impact of government economic policy is combining three potential cost reduction 
factors (w, v, I,) with one potential cost increase (z).  Whether or not the overall sign of   డ௟೔
డ௣೔
    is 
greater or less than zero will depend to a large extent on the quality of a country’s institutions and 
on how the government economic policy is directed.  If government economic policy is directed 
towards more productive uses that lower ' labor, capital and/or institutional costs of providing basic 
social amenities then this will help turn the prediction towards lower marginal costs. If marginal 
costs of providing basic social amenities fall for countries as a result of effective government 
economic policy devoid of corruption, then life expectancy will increase.  In other words, if   
డ௟೔
డ௣೔
< 0   and   డ௫೔
డ௣೔
> 0 . Two variants of our life expectancy equation are estimated as shown in 
equation 2 and 3 below, variables such as country specific income using GDP/capita, total labor 
market participation rate and institutional quality, medical access, provision of social amenities, 
used to depict exogenous effects that affect life expectancy.  The model present a case where life 
expectancy (ܮ݂݅݁. ݁ݔ݌௜௧) is a function of, government economic policy  ( ݌݋݈݅ܿݕ௜,௧  ), and the vector 
of exogenous effects that affect life expectancy  ௜ܺ௧  . The list of exogenous variables in equation 2, 
consist of, income (GDP per capita), the quality of institutions which captures the effectiveness of  (૛. )             ࡸ࢏ࢌࢋ.ࢋ࢞࢖࢏࢚  = ࢼ૙ + ࢼ૚ࢄ࢏,࢚ + ࢼ૛ ࢖࢕࢒࢏ࢉ࢟࢏,࢚ + ࢿ࢏࢚   
(૜. )             ࡸ࢏ࢌࢋ.ࢋ࢞࢖࢏࢚  = ࢼ૙ + ࢼ૚ࢄ࢏,࢚ + ࢼ૛ࡳ࢕࢜.ࡿ࢖ࢋ࢔ࢊ࢏࢔ࢍ࢏,࢚ + ࢿ࢏࢚   
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institutions in executing government policies and  bringing its impact close to the grassroots,  labor 
market participation rate which reflects the percentage of the population that can access basic 
facilities (since they are not free) through been empowered by some form of employment, foreign 
aid since most African countries receive foreign aid, access to basic health care which reflects how 
easy it is for the population living within a country to access basic health services to reduce risk of 
death related to infections and diseases, access to basic clean drinking water which captures the 
availability of social amenities, country specific total population which puts a strain on the budget 
of a country depending on how populated a country is although we use the logarithm of population 
in our final analysis due to scaling issues in our estimates. The fiscal variables is separated from 
what we refer to as government economic policy so as to allow us differentiate the difference of the 
impact of government monetary and trade policy from its fiscal policy. The reason for this is that 
government consumption spending is likely to have a strong positive effect on life expectancy 
therefore investigating its effect on life expectancy will allows us know the extent to which 
government welfare spending in African countries contributes to longevity  life expectancy. (See 
Appendix D.  for the summary of all data and their sources).  Equation 2 can be rewritten in 
equation 3 to depict the effect of government consumption spending ܩ݋ݒ. ܵ݌݁݊݀݅݊݃௜,௧ on life 
expectancy as shown above. Finally economic policy is interacted with institutions to determine the 
effect of institutions on economic policy effectiveness. In this case equation 2 is rewritten below as 
equation 2! 
(2! . )        ࡸ࢏ࢌࢋ. ࢋ࢞࢖  = ࢼ૙ + ࢼ૚ࢄ࢏,࢚ + ࢼ૛ ࢖࢕࢒ଙࢉ࢟ ෣ ࢏,࢚ + ࢼ૜࢏࢔࢚ࢋ࢘ࢇࢉ࢚࢏,࢚ + ࢿ࢏࢚    
Where interact = economic policy*institutional quality, some hypothesis that we wish to test in this 
paper are as follows, 
Hypothesis #1.)  Government Economic policy (it’s monetary and trade policy) can have either a 
positive or negative effect on life expectancy due to poor institutions. 
 
 Hypothesis #2.) Government Consumption spending (government fiscal policy) will have a 
positive effect on life expectancy due to high prevalence of diseases and shortages of social 
amenities in Africa.  
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Hypothesis #3.) Economic policy will have a positive effect on life expectancy if institutions are 
taken into consideration in executing economic policies. 
 
Hypothesis #4.) Social amenities can have a positive or negative effect on life expectancy in 
countries, depending on the level of their availability. 
 
Hypothesis #5.)  School enrolment might contribute to longevity in a positive or negative manner 
depending on the extent to which schools are accessible and affordable in African countries. Since 
social awareness through education can be greatly affected by the level of literacy in countries. 
 
Hypothesis #6.) Labor market participation can have a positive or negative effect on longevity in 
countries depending on the level of employment present in countries. Since medical care and use of 
social amenities are not likely to be free. 
 
Hypothesis #7.) GDP/capita can have a positive or negative effect on economic policy in countries, 
since income will affect governments ability to fulfill its social obligation to its citizens. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
Does economic policy affect life expectancy? 
 
             In this study three variants of the life expectancy equation is estimated, this is shown in 
equations 4 to 9 below.  The assertion is based on the argument that government decisions is of two 
forms one that deals with its monetary and trade decisions (which is referred to as  economic policy 
in this study) and the other that captures its public spending (which is referred to as government 
spending). It is reasonable that they should have an impact on life expectancy in a different manner 
with government consumption spending having much more capability in reducing mortality rate due 
to its direct focus on welfare projects while government economic policy on the other hand could 
either have a positive or negative result depending on institutions. If the aim of government is to 
make life relatively comfortable for its citizens, it is expected that government economic and social 
decisions will be one that mitigates risk associated with mortality rate and alleviates poverty 
through employment. Hausman specification test was run to choose between fixed and random 
effects.  Results accept the null hypothesis that the fixed effects estimator is not biased (p-values are 
all considerably lower than .01) for the two variants of our life expectancy equation. The use of 
instrumental variables approach is because of the endogeneity of the economic policy and 
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government consumption spending variables since they are likely to suffer from measurement 
problems. A Hausman-Wu test rejected the null hypothesis that economic policy and government 
spending were exogenous, with a p-value of 0.00.  Therefore, using them as independent variables 
could lead to biased results.  An instrument was used as proxy in each case for both government 
policy and consumption spending which were assumed to be endogenous. The three variants of our 
life expectancy equation is presented below to explain how economic policy and consumption 
spending affects life expectancy. 
Life Expectancy Model Specification with Economic Policy 
         In the first variant of the life expectancy, in equation 5 life expectancy depends on economic 
policy and our vector of exogenous X୧,୲  which consist of foreign aid, access to health  (૝. )           ࡼ࢕࢒࢏ࢉ࢟࢏࢚ = ࢻ૙ + ࢻ૚ ࢄ࢏࢚+ ࢻ૛ ࢆ࢏࢚  + ࢉ࢏  +  µ࢏࢚    
(૞. )             ࡸ࢏ࢌࢋ.ࢋ࢞࢖࢏࢚  = ࢼ૙ + ࢼ૚ࢄ࢏,࢚ + ࢼ૛ ࡼ࢕࢒ଙࢉ࢟෣ ࢏,࢚ + ࢉ࢏  + µ࢏࢚   
care, the logarithm of income (GDP per capita), the quality of institutions, access to water (which 
capture provision of basic social amenities), country specific population, labor market participation 
rate, cost of living and school enrollment rate. Life expectancy therefore is expected to be affected 
by the rate at which government responds to economic factors that are likely to increase mortality 
rate. Hyper inflation for example could mean firms closing down and laying off workers and 
adverse reduction in trade could result in a general shrinkage of a nation’s economy leading to 
adverse economic circumstances such as reduced national income and lack of funds to maintain 
infrastructure and social services. Since we suggest that government economic policy is likely to 
suffer from measurement problems, so we assume that it is endogenous this is supported by results 
of the Hausman-Wu test for endogeity as stated earlier therefore using economic policy as an 
exogenous variable is likely to lead to inconsistent estimates. Equation 4 represents the reduced 
form of the equation for government economic policy, government economic policy depends on 
country specific income, and our vector of instrument ܼ௜௧  . Therefore equation 4 and 5 are estimated 
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simultaneously.  Exclusion restriction is achieved by assuming that certain variables (in this case a 
variable) are correlated with government economic policy in equation 4 but not with life expectancy 
in equation 5, allowing us to achieve identification by excluding some variables in equation 5. 
Country specific investment in stocks was used as instrument for economic policy this allows us to 
conduct instrumental correction for economic policy in equation 4. 
  
Life Expectancy Model Specification with Government Consumption Spending 
        The second variant of the life expectancy specification is shown below, government 
consumption spending is assumed to be endogenous in equation 7, so the instrumental correction  (૟. )           ࡳ࢕࢜.ࡿ࢖ࢋ࢔ࢊ࢏࢔ࢍ ࢏࢚ = ࢻ૙ + ࢻ૚ ࢄ࢏࢚+ ࢻ૛ ࢆ࢏࢚  + ࢉ࢏  +  µ࢏࢚    
(ૠ. )             ࡸ࢏ࢌࢋ.ࢋ࢞࢖࢏࢚  = ࢼ૙ + ࢼ૚ࢄ࢏,࢚ + ࢼ૛ ࡳ࢕࢜.ࡿ࢖ࢋ࢔ࢊଙ࢔ࢍ෣ ࢏,࢚ + ࢉ࢏  + µ࢏࢚   
was conducted  in equation 6. Life expectancy depends on government consumption spending and 
our vector of exogenous variables. Our vectors of exogenous variables( ௜ܺ,௧) are the logarithm of 
population, income (GDP per capita) labor market participation, market capitalization rate, foreign 
direct investment inflow, school enrollment rate, electoral self determination (political stability) 
exchange rate, inflation and openness. The disposition for increased government consumption 
spending will depend on a host of factors, its income, and the condition of its economy as well as its 
political disposition. Therefore if a government sees it citizens as some form of assets that will 
bring some meaningful economic gains to it on the long-run it will embark on social spending with 
the aim of getting returns. It is expected that government spending will have a positive effect on life 
expectancy. It was also assumed that government consumption spending is endogenous since it 
suffers from measurement problems since short term payouts such as salary increases and social 
benefits e.g. subsidies make up government consumption spending and affect life expectancy on the 
short run this was also supported by the Hausman-Wu test for for endogeneity.  In equation 6, 
government consumption spending depends on the logarithm of country specific income, and our 
vectors of instruments ܼ௜௧  . In this health access was used as instrument for government 
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consumption spending,  this allows the instrumental correction to be done in equation 6,  using 
health access since we assume that government spending is endogenous as stated earlier. 
 
Economic policy and interaction variable institution (policy*institutions 
           The third variant of the life expectancy equation is presented in equations 8 and 9.  Including 
an interactive variable (interact) policy*institutions offers additional opportunity to study the effect 
institution has on policy effectiveness. Using predictive variables that capture economic policy in 
our first stage  we regressed economic policy on income and stocks of investment and obtain the 
residuals since economic policy is endogenous, we multiplied the residuals with institutions to get 
our interaction variable (interact) and use the interaction variable in our second stage this method is 
known as general least square (GLS).  (ૡ. )           ࢖࢕࢒࢏ࢉ࢟ ࢏࢚ = ࢻ૙ + ࢻ૚ ࢄ࢏࢚+ ࢻ૛ ࢆ࢏࢚   +  ࢿ࢏࢚    (ૢ. )             ࡸ࢏ࢌࢋ.ࢋ࢞࢖࢏࢚  = ࢼ૙ + ࢼ૚ࢄ࢏,࢚ + ࢼ૛ ࢖࢕࢒ଙࢉ࢟ ෣ ࢏,࢚ + ࢼ૜࢏࢔࢚ࢋ࢘ࢇࢉ࢚࢏,࢚ + ࢿ࢏࢚   
Our interaction variable will depend on institutional quality’s effect on economic policy this allows 
us to depict how institutions affect economic policy effectiveness using GLS random effects.  
 
Instruments 
          A careful explanation of why our exclusion restriction will hold for our different model 
specifications is offered here to depict the validity and relevance of utilized instruments. The 
exclusion restriction that is imposed on the life expectancy equation is that the instrument should be 
correlated with economic policy in the first set of equations (equations 4 and 5), government 
consumption spending in the second set of equations (equation 6 and 7), and economic policy again 
in the third set of equations where we used two stage GLS (equation 8 and 9) but not with life 
expectancy. Theoretically this will hold based on the following conditions, if the coefficient for the 
endogenous variable in the structural equation after imposing the restriction (where the instrument 
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is used as a proxy for the endogenous variable) tends to that in the reduced form equation and 
secondly, if the correlation between the instrument Z and the error term ߝ௜,௧  is identically equal to 
zero as shown below in equation 10.  
 (10)         E|ࢆ࢏,࢚.  ࢿ࢏,࢚ | = 0.  
This shows that the instrument ܼ௜,௧ is uncorrelated with the disturbances ߝ௜,௧ and this therefore 
stipulates that the only way the instrument is related with life expectancy is only through the 
endogenous variable and finally, if the exogenous component of the instrument, (the fitted value of 
the endogenous variable for economic policy and government spending as the case maybe) is 
uncorrelated with the error term, the variation in the dependent variable life expectancy (in years) 
can be identified as the slope of coefficient  ߚଶ (see Kraay (2008) for further discussion on 
exclusion restriction) we depict this in equation 11 below.   
    (11)      Cov (࢖࢕࢒࢏ࢉ࢟࢏,࢚ .  ࢿ࢏,࢚   ) ≠0 and Cov (ࢍ࢕࢜. ࢙࢖ࢋ࢔ࢊ࢏࢔ࢍ ࢏,࢚ .  ࢿ࢏,࢚   ) ≠0  
This means that ߙଶ in not zero therefore life expectancy will vary with changes in economic policy 
and government spending as the case may be. The instruments should fulfill the above conditions 
for our exclusion restriction to hold, this can be explained further below in a nut shell 
econometrically as follows. First, the instruments should have a significant impact on the variable 
they predict. Secondly the instrument should not have an impact on the dependent variable (life 
expectancy in this case) in the second equation. While often this is tested empirically, Wooldridge 
(2010) and others have pointed out that this also needs to be done on the theoretical level as testing 
the impact of the instrument on the dependent variable in the second equation (life expectancy) with 
a full model could be biased as the instrumental correction has not been made for in the endogenous 
variable (i.e. economic policy or government consumption spending as the case maybe). Stock of 
investment was used as instrument for economic policy, while health access was used as instrument 
for government consumption spending. Investment in stocks reflects the value that investors place 
on a country stocks and the value of stocks at any point in time reflects the quality of government 
economic policy. It is expected that stock of investment will be correlated with government 
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economic policy but not with life expectancy for our exclusion restriction to hold for our first set of 
equations (i.e. equations 4 and 5). One way to view this is that investors will hold a country’s stocks 
as long as the government maintains stable, sound and consistent economic policies and in cases 
where a government economic policy is weak, investors are likely to dump such stocks or not invest 
in such economies. It is also expected that a country specific stock of investment will have no direct 
effect on life expectancy since if government does not have good economic and social policy to 
reduce factors that are a risk to longevity, gains from investment might not affect life expectancy. 
Therefore the only way through which stock of investment will be related to life expectancy is 
through government economic policy. It is also expected that for the exclusion restriction to hold ( 
in the second set of equations i.e. 6 and 7), that health care access should be correlated with 
government spending in equation 6, but not directly with life expectancy in our second in equation 
7.This will be based on the fact that access to medical care even though if available, is not likely to 
be free nor easily afforded  in many African countries which are characterized with  high a 
population of poor people, so we do not expect that the availability of medical care will lead 
automatically to increase in life expectancy. The only way through which health access will be 
related to life expectancy is through government spending, by creating enabling environment 
(through its spending) in which people can develop skills at subsidized rate Based on these two 
assumptions we are able to impose the exclusion restriction on the two different model 
specifications (i.e. the life expectancy models with economic policy and government spending) and 
argue that the restrictions will hold. Only one instrument is used in each case so our model 
specifications are exactly identified since the number of instrument is the same as endogenous 
regressor. The instruments we use are highly correlated with our endogenous variables and quite 
relevant (see first stage regressions results in Tables 1 and 2).  
 
 
Results 
        Fixed effect regression was used , for the first two specification of  the life expectancy 
equations, since the result of the Hausman test with p-value 0.000 suggest that fixed effect 
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estimation is more appropriate for our model, see Baltagi (2005), Baltagi and Wu (2010) and 
Wooldridge (2010) for further discussion. . Time effect (year dummies) was included to capture the 
differences in life expectancy over years. The results are shown in Tables 3 to 4. We controlled for 
time effect using year dummies for the specification for economic policy and government 
consumption spending but this did not hold for the model with the “interact” effect instead year 
effect was used because our results did not follow a chi square distribution with year dummies. The 
results of the F-test in Tables 1 and 1 shows that our instruments are highly correlated with the first 
stage dependent variables respectively.  The results in Table 3 show that economic policy has no 
effect on life expectancy using OLS (with p-value 0.914) and has a negative significant effect on 
life expectancy using 2SLS after controlling for endogeneity, using investment in stock as 
instrumental correction for economic policy (with p-value 0.016). This shows the importance of 
controlling for endogeneity since economic policy might suffer from measurement problems. The 
results in Table 4 show that government consumption spending has an effect (with p-value 0.014) 
on life expectancy using OLS and has a stronger effect (with p-value 0.000) on life expectancy 
using 2SLS. This shows the relevance once more of using health access as instrumental correction 
for government consumption spending, since we assume that government consumption is 
endogenous. The results in Table 5 show that government economic policy has a negative effect (p-
value 0.019) on life expectancy without interacting economic policy with institution. After 
interacting economic policy with institutions the interactive variable (interact) becomes weakly 
statistically significant (p-value 0.061). This shows that economic policy contributes to a reduction 
in life expectancy, without the appropriate institutions to execute policies. 
Robustness Check:  Alternative measure of economic policy and institutional quality indexes were 
used, this was constructed using regression component approach previously used by Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) to determine how robust our regression estimates are. The economic policy index 
developed with regression component approach (RCA) weighs the effect that economic policy has 
on life expectancy therefore this index depends on life expectancy. Using another set of index 
allows us to know if indeed the economic policy results obtained using the PCA index are robust.  
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The results are presented in the appendix see Tables 6 to 8. Appendix A. Table 6 Columns 1 and 2 
shows the first stage results where a comparison is made in the results where PCA and RCA were 
used as controls in the model specification for economic policy. The result shows that investment in 
stocks is highly correlated with economic policy. Appendix B. Table 7 Columns 1 and 2 show that 
economic policy was contributing in a negative manner to life expectancy in the countries in our 
sample using 2SLS, although the results where RCA index was used as control for economic policy 
contributed significantly in a negative manner in reducing life expectancy (see regression estimates 
in Table 7 Columns 1 and 2 for economic policy of -2.13 and -4.19 for PCA and RCA values 
respectively).  Appendix C. Table 8 Columns 1 and 2 show the results of the interaction variable 
economic policy*institutions used to determine how effective economic policy will be on life 
expectancy if channeled through appropriate institutions. The results do not differ significantly from 
those where the PCA indexes was used as controls. The interaction variable showed that economic 
policy contributed in a significant manner to life expectancy (see regression estimates of 3.08 and 
0.23 in Table 8 Columns 1 and 2 respectively) although the result where we used the economic 
policy index constructed using the RCA index was more significant than using that obtained using 
PCA. However the RCA measure of institutional quality contributed in a positive significant 
manner to life expectancy whereas the PCA measure had a negative effect on life expectancy but 
was not significant (see Appendix B Table 7 Columns 1 and 2 regression estimates for institutions 
of -2.4 and 2.82 for PCA and RCA indexes). The institutional measure using RCA was obtained 
from weights that our variables that capture institution have on life expectancy using OLS, 
institutions are likely to exert either a positive or negative effect on any dependent variable. The use 
of interaction variables allows us to determine how effective they are in the presence of a policy 
that can affect life expectancy. This was found does not affect the quality of the index since as 
stated earlier that the interaction variable economic policy*institutions show that institutions 
improve the effectiveness of economic policy for both results (see Appendix C. Table 8). 
 Based on the above results we answer the hypothesis that were posed earlier below 
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Hypothesis #1.)  Government Economic policy (governments monetary and trade policy) had a 
negative significant effect on life expectancy. It was likely that economic policy was contributing 
negatively to longevity in the countries in our sample. 
 
 Hypothesis #2.) Government Consumption spending (government fiscal policy) had a positive 
effect on life expectancy. This shows that government consumption spending was likely 
contributing to increase in longevity since it consisted of welfare spending used in cushioning risk 
factors to longevity through the establishment of social infrastructure. 
 
Hypothesis #3.) Economic policy was found to contribute to longevity in a significant manner 
when institutional quality was interacted with economic policy. It was likely that institutions were 
not taken into consideration or bypassed in economic policy implementation. Implementing 
economic policies through appropriate channels such as a credible civil service and following due 
process could lead to a substantial improvement in economic policy effectiveness. 
 
Hypothesis #4.) Social amenities had a negative effect on life expectancy in countries, it was likely 
that lack of basic amenities such as portable drinking water, and electricity etc was contributing in a 
negative manner to longevity. 
 
Hypothesis #5.)  School enrolment had a positive effect on longevity. This shows that provision of 
means to accessible and affordable education in African countries was likely promoting longevity.  
 
Hypothesis #6.) Labor market participation had a negative effect on longevity in countries. This 
shows that it was likely that  the level of employment present in countries can make medical care 
and use of social amenities which are not free less accessible to a greater percentage of the populace 
due to their poor earning power. 
 
Hypothesis #7.) GDP/capita had a negative effect on economic policy, therefore it was possible that 
poor income led to government’s inability to fulfill its social obligation in countries. 
 
 
Conclusion 
        It was found that government economic policy has a negative effect on life expectancy in 
Africa. This showed that economic policy was not contributing positively to longevity. Government 
consumption spending had a positive significant effect on life expectancy, and therefore cushions 
factors that militate against longevity. We also found that the variable “interact” has a positive 
effect and significantly improves the effect of economic policy on life expectancy thereby making it 
contribute to positively longevity. This showed that channeling policies through appropriate 
institutions makes economic policies to have an effect on life expectancy. The policy implication of 
19 
 
our results is that improving government economic policy (i.e. it’s monetary and trade policy) could 
significantly improve life expectancy in African countries, since economic policy is currently 
contributing negatively to longevity among African countries. Sound and consistent policies could 
help create employment and can play a role in the effective execution of public projects that can 
affect the lives of people living in many poor countries significantly. Reducing inflation and 
allowing strong private participation in business could rapidly transform many African countries 
and help reduce mortality rates by economically empowering its indigenous population. The results 
are consistent with past literature such as Karl (1997) and Ross (2001), which states that corruption 
significantly, weakens economic policy in many African countries making such policies to be 
ineffective in alleviating poverty among their indigenous population. Government consumption 
spending was contributing positively to longevity, this implies by our results that governments in 
Africa are likely to continue to spend heavily on consumption. Executing sound policies that could 
reduce government consumption spending to a sustainable level should be a top priority for many 
African countries. Our results also support reports by World Health Organization 2010 and 
UNICEF report 2011, that a host of factors are responsible for low life expectancy in Africa this 
makes government to be overwhelmed with numerous risk factors that reduce longevity leading to 
huge spending to mitigate such risks which are the causes of high death rate plaguing the African 
continent. 
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Table 1. First Stage: Economic Policy Regressions 
  
 Method of Estimation                        OLS  
GDP/capita -0.73 
 
 
(.75) 
 
   Institutional quality -0.31 
 
 
(.21) 
 
   Foreign aid -0.008 
 
 
(.05) 
 
   Access to medical care -0.008 
 
 
(.05) 
    Provision of social amenities -0.01 
 
 
(.01) 
    Population   1.59 
 
 
(1.21) 
    Exchange rate 0.19 
 
 
 (.14)* 
 
   FDI 0.05 
 
 
(.04) 
    Labor market labor participation 0.14 
 
 
(.23) 
 
   School enrollment 0.07 
 
 
(.05) 
 
   Cost of living 0.30 
 
 
(.06) 
 
   Stock of investment -0.003 
 
 
(.001)*** 
 F-Test 8.55 
 Chi2 (p-value) 0.03 
 # of observations 70  
R-Squared 0.50    
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
21 
 
 
Table 2. First Stage: Government Consumption Spending  Regressions 
 
 Method of Estimation                       OLS 
GDP/capita -1.17 
 
 
(.63)* 
 Population  0.33 
 
 
(1.21) 
 Labor market participation rate -0.68 
 
 
(.35) 
  FDI -0.04 
 
 
(.04) 
 Market capitalization 0.01 
 
 
(.01) 
       School enrollment 0.003 
 
 
(.02) 
 Exchange rate 0.02 
 
 
(.01)** 
    Inflation -0.001 
 
 
(.01) 
  Openness  -0.04 
 
 
(.01) 
  Political stability -0.12 
 
 
(.14) 
 Health access 0.04 
 
 
(.01)*** 
 F-Test 17.99 
 Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 
 # of observations 52 
 R-Squared 0.99   
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 3. Economic Policy Regressions 
     Method of Estimation          OLS    2SLS   
Economic policy 0.04 
 
-2.13   
 
(.32) 
 
(.89)** 
      GDP/capita 1.32 
 
-2.56 
 
 
(1.61) 
 
(1.77) 
      Institution index -0.11 
 
-0.24 
 
 
(0.35) 
 
(0.40) 
      Foreign aid 0.33 
 
0.06 
 
 
(.12)** 
 
(.12) 
      Access to medical care 0.03 
 
0.04 
 
 
(.03) 
 
(.04) 
      Provision of social amenities -0.03 
 
-0.07 
 
 
(.03) 
 
(.03)*** 
      Population   0.15 
 
-0.79 
 
 
(.71) 
 
(2.06) 
      Exchange rate -1.33 
 
0.48 
 
 
 (.30)*** 
 
(.32) 
      FDI 0.23 
 
0.20 
 
 
(.14) 
 
(.16) 
 Labor market participation -0.19 
 
-0.73 
 
 
(.12) 
 
(.73) 
     School enrollment  0.11 
 
0.21 
 
 
(.05)** 
 
(.04)*** 
     Cost of living -0.04 
 
0.31 
 
 
(.02) 
 
(1.25) 
     Instrument               - 
 
Investment in stocks 
 Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 
 
0.00 
 # of observations 70  
 
70  
 R-Squared 0.90    0.57   
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
 significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 4. Government Consumption Spending Regressions 
    Method of Estimation                   OLS    2SLS   
Government Consumption Spending 2.89 
 
3.02   
 
(1.08)** 
 
(.62)*** 
      GDP/capita 1.36 
 
6.08 
 
 
(3.24) 
 
(1.34)*** 
      Population 1.33 
 
-2.29 
 
 
(2.24) 
 
(3.13) 
      Labor market participation 1.0 
 
-1.70 
 
 
(.54)* 
 
(.60)*** 
      FDI -0.45 
 
0.04 
 
 
(.27) 
 
(.07) 
      Market capitalization 0.08 
 
-0.06 
 
 
(.06) 
 
(.02)*** 
      School enrollment    -0.12 
 
0.05 
 
 
(.13) 
 
(.03) 
      Exchange rate -0.13 
 
0.003 
 
 
 (.05)** 
 
(.03) 
      Inflation 0.09 
 
-0.01 
 
 
(.08) 
 
(.02) 
 Openness -0.02 
 
0.03 
 
 
(.06) 
 
(.05) 
    Political stability  0.49 
 
0.66 
 
 
(1.14) 
 
(.32)** 
    Instrument                          - 
 
Health access 
 Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 
 
0.00 
 # of observations 52  
 
51  
 R-Squared 0.95   0.97   
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
 significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 5. Economic Policy and interaction with institutions Regressions 
   Method of Estimation                         GLS      
Economic Policy -14.23 
 
  
 
(5.96)** 
      Economic policy*institutions 3.08 
  
 
(1.64)* 
     GDP/capita 0.70 
  
 
(1.22) 
      Foreign aid 0.28 
  
 
(.10)*** 
      Access to medical care 0.06 
  
 
(.02) 
      Provision of social amenities -0.03 
  
 
(.02) 
      Population   -0.61 
  
 
(.45) 
      Exchange rate -0.93 
  
 
 (.20)*** 
      FDI 0.11 
  
 
(.11) 
     Labor market participation -0.09 
  
 
(.09) 
      School enrollment  0.04 
  
 
(.04)** 
      Cost of living -0.01 
  
 
(.02) 
      Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 
  # of observations 70  
  R-Squared 0.94     
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Appendix 
The robustness check results are shown in the appendix. All of the other results are shown in the 
body of the paper 
Appendix A. Table 6  First Stage Robustness Check   
    
 Method of Estimation 
        PCA Index 
               (1) 
             OLS    
RCA Index 
(2) 
OLS   
Investment in Stocks -0.003 
 
-0.0002   
 
(.001)*** 
 
(.0001)*** 
      GDP/capita -0.73 
 
-0.73 
 
 
(.75) 
 
(.26)*** 
      Institution index -0.31 
 
0.36 
 
 
(0.21) 
 
(0.14)*** 
      Foreign aid -0.01 
 
0.003 
 
 
(.05) 
 
(.02) 
      Access to medical care 0.01 
 
-0.004 
 
 
(.01) 
 
(.03) 
      Provision of social amenities -0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
 
(.01)*** 
 
(.01) 
      Population   1.59 
 
0.76 
 
 
(1.21) 
 
(.49) 
      Exchange rate 0.19 
 
0.02 
 
 
 (.14) 
 
(.06) 
      FDI 0.05 
 
0.02 
 
 
(.04) 
 
(.03) 
 Labor market participation 0.14 
 
0.26 
 
 
(.23) 
 
(.11)** 
     School enrollment  0.07 
 
0.03 
 
 
(.05) 
 
(.01)** 
     Cost of living 0.30 
 
-0.05 
 
 
(.06) 
 
(.05) 
     F-Test               8.55 
 
             13.09 
 Chi2 (p-value) 0.03 
 
0.00 
 # of observations 70  
 
66  
 R-Squared 0.50   0.74   
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
 significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Appendix B. Table 7  Robustness Check  
    
 Method of Estimation 
        PCA Index 
               (1) 
             2SLS    
RCA Index 
(2) 
2SLS   
Economic Policy -2.13 
 
-4.19   
 
(.87)** 
 
(1.22)*** 
      GDP/capita -2.56 
 
-4.77 
 
 
(1.77) 
 
(1.44)*** 
      Institution index -0.24 
 
2.82 
 
 
(0.40) 
 
(0.82)*** 
      Foreign aid 0.06 
 
0.07 
 
 
(.12) 
 
(.07) 
      Access to medical care 0.04 
 
0.05 
 
 
(.04) 
 
(.03) 
      Provision of social amenities -0.07 
 
-0.05 
 
 
(.03)*** 
 
(.02)** 
      Population   -0.79 
 
-4.37 
 
 
(2.06) 
 
(1.70)** 
      Exchange rate 0.48 
 
-0.33 
 
 
 (.32) 
 
(.25) 
      FDI 0.20 
 
0.30 
 
 
(.16) 
 
(.10)*** 
 Labor market participation -0.73 
 
-0.92 
 
 
(.73) 
 
(.52)*** 
     School enrollment  0.21 
 
0.20 
 
 
(.04)*** 
 
(.03)*** 
     Cost of living 0.31 
 
0.18 
 
 
(1.25) 
 
(.36) 
     Instrument Investment in stocks 
 
Investment in stocks 
 Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 
 
0.00 
 # of observations 70  
 
66  
 R-Squared 0.57    0.63   
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
 significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Appendix C. Table 8 Robustness Check  
    
 Method of Estimation 
        PCA Index 
               (1) 
             GLS    
RCA Index 
(2) 
GLS   
Economic Policy -14.23 
 
-4.70   
 
(5.96)** 
 
(.23)** 
      Economic policy*institutions 3.08 
 
0.23 
 (1.64)* 
 
(0.02)*** 
   GDP/capita              0.70 
 
0.57 
 
 
(.22) 
 
(.88)*** 
      Foreign aid 0.28 
 
0.18 
 
 
(.10)*** 
 
(.07)*** 
      Access to medical care 0.06 
 
0.05 
 
 
(.02)*** 
 
(.02)*** 
      Provision of social amenities -0.03 
 
-0.03 
 
 
(.02)*** 
 
(.02)*** 
      Population   -0.61 
 
-0.71 
 
 
(.45) 
 
(.34)** 
      Exchange rate -0.93 
 
-0.83 
 
 
 (.20)*** 
 
(.16)*** 
      FDI 0.11 
 
0.06 
 
 
(.11) 
 
(.08) 
 Labor market participation -0.09 
 
-0.12 
 
 
(.09) 
 
(.07)* 
     School enrollment  0.04 
 
0.09 
 
 
(.03) 
 
(.03)*** 
     Cost of living -0.01 
 
0.002 
 
 
(.02) 
 
(.02) 
     Chi2 (p-value) 0.00 
 
0.00 
 # of observations 70  
 
70 
 R-Squared 0.94    0.96   
Notes: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** refers to 
 significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Appendix D. Data and Sources 
 
i. Dependent Variable: Life Expectancy, this is the average life span of men and women  
living in a geographical location. This obtained from World Bank data. 
ii. Explanatory Variables: 
a. Economic Policy, this was obtained using PCA from variables such as inflation  
and trade openness which we obtain from World Bank data. The PCA measure captures the average 
variation in the two variables to obtain a single index for economic policy using Eigen value 
transformation. To test for robustness of our estimates we also use another method RCA to 
construct a measure of policy by regressing life expectancy on inflation, trade openness and other 
exogenous variables. The RCA index allows us to derive another economic policy index using the 
weight that inflation and openness exert on life expectancy. RCA Index is given by Economic 
Policy = Constant + (inflation*coefficient) + (openness*coefficient) 
b. Institutional Quality: We also construct two measures of institutions using PCA  
and RCA. The PCA index captures the average variation in three variables electoral self 
determination rate, torture rate and freedom of movement. While the RCA variables were obtained 
by regressing life expectancy on the three aforementioned variables plus other exogenous variables. 
It is given as Life Expectancy=Constant+(electoral self determination rate* coefficient ) + 
(Torture*coefficient)+(freedom of movement*coefficient) .We obtain these political variables from 
Brigham University CIRI data . 
c. Government Consumption Spending is amount in USD that government spends 
on welfare and social infrastructure. It is obtained from data market of Iceland for a period of 1980 
to 2008. 
d. Exchange Rate: This is the fluctuation in the value of the local currency with  
respect to the dollar we obtain this from World Bank data.  We used this to economic capture 
fluctuations globally. 
e. GDP/Capita: This is the total amount of goods produced by country we divide this  
by population to obtain GDP/Capita and this represents country specific income. This was obtained 
from World Bank data. 
f. FDI: This is the total inflow of all foreign investment to a country in constant  
USD. We obtain this from World Bank Data. 
g. School Enrollment Rate: This represent the average primary school enrollment  
rate for boys and girls between the ages of 1-15 years of age. It represents human capita 
development rate (level of literacy by country and skill) we obtained this from World Bank data. 
h. Cost of Living, we used crude oil price to capture cost of living  
i. Health Care Access is the percentage of the population of children of ages 0-10  
years who are immunized. 
j. Provision of Social Amenities, was measured using percentage access to clean  
drinking water 
k. Population is the total number of people living in a geography area; this was used  
to capture budget constraints to government planning. 
l. Labor Market Participation Rate percentage of employed among workforce 
m. Investment in Stocks this is the total value of countries stock of investment in  
USD. 
n. Foreign Aid/GDP this was measured using effective aid per GDP. 
All data are for a period of 1980 to 2008 and obtained from World Bank data except otherwise 
stated. 
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